In the contemporary philosophical debate
on human dignity exists a view that understands it as self-respect. This concept can roughly
be said to have its origins in Avishai Margalit’s The Decent Society and centers on a discussion of humiliation. The
definition of dignity as something that can be lost and has to be protected is
closely linked to the discussion of human rights. The link between dignity, human rights and humiliation is also discussed in other disciplines. The theoretical definition is usually approached ex negativo, i.e. as an attempt to show how humiliation is the
negation of self-respect. I think a shift in perspective needs to be integrated in
this view, as the negation of self-respect can only be self-humiliation.
Philosophers tend to establish
an objective perspective that is not linked to the individual feelings of a
person who is humiliated. Self-esteem or self-worth seem to get in the way of a neutral
understanding of what humiliation is supposed to mean. It is often sketched as
an assault on an attitude all human beings share – like a wish to be respected
as individuals or a belief that we should have normative authority over ourselves. Yet, this does not seem to be what self-respect usually denotes; and in whatever way
humiliating experiences actually affect the self-respect of the afflicted
person – her persuasion that she is worth just as much as all her fellow human
beings cannot simply be destroyed from the outside. I do not want to imply that
anyone could develop a feeling of self-worth without a (to a certain extent)
positive social environment. However, a negative influence like humiliation is
not enough to explain how self-respect is corrupted.
I believe that an inside
perspective, heeding the psychological dimension of what happens when someone
feels humiliated and loses self-respect, needs to be developed. Moreover, the
crucial experience that endangers dignity is not humiliation as such, but self-degradation. Someone can only lose self-respect by denying this
respect to herself. And this can ultimately only be done by herself. Once this
inner process is focused we can ask for the prototypical situations that negate
human dignity as self-respect. My suggestion is that these are moments of
extreme shame in the way they are defined by Brené Brown (cf. Brown, 2012 71-74).
Of course, shame is a cultural phenomenon and differs in diverse
sociohistorical contexts. We really need to focus on the involved fear of social exclusion and the processes that undermine self-worth. Yet, in western cultures the analysis of shame seems
to be an extremely fruitful area to understand how dignity is impaired by certain
social practices. It also allows us to think about the vital perspectives we
should take on life to enable us to live in dignity.
Sources
Brown,
Brené. Daring Greatly – How the Courage
to Be Vulnerable Transforms the Way We Live,Love, Parent, and Lead. New York: Gotham, 2012.
Margalit, Avishai. The Decent Society (transl. Naomi
Goldblum). Cambridge/Mass. Harvard UP, 1996.
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